Proceedings of the International scientific and practical conference ―Modern Science and Education‖ (January 5-7, 2026) / Publisher website: www.naukainfo.com. – Liverpool, United Kingdom, 2026. – 174 p.

75 Germany, France, Japan, Italy, etc.) have delegated high-ranking officials to coordinate financial, technical, and political resources. However, in the absence of a unified international legal framework and clear integration of these entities into the structure of Ukraine's executive branch, a risk of "destructive complementarity" arises. This state is characterized by a situation where the multiplicity of institutional mechanisms, which ought to complement each other, leads to the fragmentation of efforts, dilution of responsibility, and an increase in management transaction costs. The conceptual foundation of this research is based on the theory of institutional complementarity developed by U. Pagano and D. North. According to their approaches, institutions are complementary if the presence of one increases the marginal efficiency of the other [1; 5]. However, in the field of international aid, the opposite effect can be observed, described by F. Fukuyama as the erosion of state capacity due to external management [3]. Issues of coordination in network structures are highlighted in the works of B. Guy Peters [6], and the analysis of Ukraine's recovery architecture is presented in the works of experts from the CEPR and the World Bank [2; 9]. The activity of special representatives for recovery is critical for bridging "institutional gaps" between donors and the Ukrainian authorities. However, the architecture of this interaction is currently overly horizontal. Each special representative acts on the basis of the national mandate of their own country, creating risks of destructive complementarity in three dimensions: 1. Operational duplication. The creation of parallel coordination councils at ministries under the patronage of various special representatives forces Ukrainian civil servants to spend significant resources preparing duplicate reports according to different standards. 2. Conflict of strategic priorities. For example, the US special representative's mandate is often focused on stimulating private investment and deregulation, while EU representatives emphasize compliance with strict environmental (Green Deal) and social standards, which may slow down the implementation of "fast-track" projects.